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Abstract 
 Religious leaders have played a leading role in the struggle for 
constitutional reforms in Kenya since 1990s.Significantly, they have argued 
over time that the constitution is the covenant of the nation and the ‘moral 
placenta’ of any meaningful democratic governance. This article therefore sets 
out to examine the mid-wifery role of religious leaders in negotiating for 
constitutional reforms in an attempt at consolidating democratic gains 
achieved following the repeal of section 2A of the then constitution on 19th 
December, 1991. The article is alive to the fact that the struggle for 
constitutional change in Kenya was an ‘hybrid enterprise’ which empirically 
cannot be analyzed by a single actor, entity or factor since many groups 
whether religious or civil society contributed in their own way in fighting for 
civil liberties and human rights. Methodologically, this is a retrospective-
historical analysis of the contribution of the Church in the wider debate of 
constitutional making process between 1992 and 2002. The central question 
being addressed is on how the Church played out its activism in the glamour 
for constitutional reforms. It sets out on the premise that their activism towards 
constitutional reforms was undergirded by reconstruction paradigm as 
articulated by African Theo-philosophers such as Jesse Ndwiga Mugambi. 
Reconstruction paradigm is a theological trajectory that builds on the Ezra-
Nehemiah motif. The article relies on archival sources as well as seven in-
depth oral interviews with key informants. 
 
Keywords: Church, Constitutional reforms, Democracy, Reconstruction 
theology, Ufungamano Initiative  
 
Introduction 
 On 19th December, 1991, the National Assembly of Kenya repealed 
the contentious Session 2 A of the then Constitution putting an end to street 
demonstration and ‘pulpit pressure’ that had characterized the struggle for 
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multi-party democracy in Kenya. Daniel Torotich Arap Moi, the second 
president of the Republic of Kenya (1978-2002) capitulated to both domestic 
and international pressure on party pluralism, hoping that with the re-
emergence of party pluralism his reign would be peaceful without a series of 
bloody street demonstration and picketing that marked the sun set period of 
1990s (Brown, 2001; Kapinde, 2015). However, this was not the case as the 
struggle shifted immediately from party pluralism debates to calls for 
constitutional reforms. 
 This article therefore, examines the contribution of the Kenyan Church 
leadership in calling for constitutional reforms. The study is alive to the fact 
that some of the Evangelical right wing Protestant Church leadership distanced 
themselves from the political debates with regard to constitution reforms with 
others siding with the State later changed tune following the defeat of KANU 
in 2002 and became active in political discourses with some opposing the 
rectification and promulgation of the 2010 Kenya’s constitution. The article is 
interested in the period between 1992 and 2002 because it acted as a precursor 
to later constitutional agitations in Kenya. More significantly however, the 
period set the agenda for the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 
regime which came to power later in 2002 following the retirement of 
president Moi. The period also exemplifies the mid-wifery role of the Church 
and religious leaders in the struggle for constitutional reforms. I considered 
this period as the ‘age of reformation’ in Kenya since the primary focus of the 
Church, religious leadership, and the civil society was on constitutional 
reforms in the wider context of reconstruction paradigm. 
 
Socio-Political and Theoretical Contours 
 Prior to these calls for constitutional reforms, President Moi like his 
predecessor; Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) had carried rudimental amendments 
on the 1963 Independence Constitution. Such that they gradually dismantled 
key clauses on civil liberties, freedoms, democracy and human rights. It is 
some of these amendments on the constitution such as the one on 9th June, 
1982 which turned Kenya into a de jure, one party State that angered 
individual clerics from ‘mission established Churches’3 to denounce Moi’s 
misrule (Kapinde, 2015). Therefore, the call for constitutional reforms was 
one of the major reconstruction projects undertaken in the history of Church-
State engagement in Kenya. This is echoed in Jesse Mugambi’s call for a shift 
in theological paradigms from liberation to reconstruction motif anchored on 
the Ezra-Nehemiah text (Mugambi, 1995, Gathogo, 2007 and Kapinde, 2015). 
Mugambi argues that reconstruction paradigm should be the modus operandie 
                                                          
3 Mission established Churches were mainline orthodox Churches that preceded the colonial 
rule in Africa. 
European Scientific Journal February 2018 edition Vol.14, No.5 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
218 
of analyzing African theological discourses rather than liberation paradigm 
which characterised the entire colonial and cold war period 
(Mugambi,1991:199). He suggested further that in the New dispensation, “the 
figure of prophet Nehemiah, unlike that of Moses, provides us with a mirror 
through which we can see our endeavours to rebuild Africa out of the ruins of 
wars against racism, colonial domination, single party dictatorship, military 
rule, poverty, economic mismanagement, corruption, neo-colonialism and 
ideological branding (Mugambi, 1995:160-180). 
 Coincidentally, Mugambi’s call for reconstruction model signified the 
collapse of military rule in most countries in Africa, and apartheid regime in 
South Africa as well as the end of one party dictatorship in Kenya as in most 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (Ibid.). To some theological commentators 
such as Julius Gathogo, the re-emergence of reconstruction paradigm at a time 
when Church clerics were calling for constitutional reforms was appropriate 
for the social, economic, and political development of Kenya (Gathogo, 2008). 
Gathogo notes that reconstruction is the major theological paradigm over 
liberation and other minor discourses such as African feminist theology, Black 
South Africa theology, and inculturation theologies in the Post-Cold war 
Africa (O.1 on 19/02/2015). 
 Others such as Tinyiko Maluleke and Joseph Wandera were skeptical 
about reconstruction praxis as they saw the whole idea to be immature, foreign 
and suspicious. Maluleke in particular is pessimistic of Mugambi’s motive 
with reconstruction and interrogates its viability. However, he admitted the 
prominence of the debate when he observed that, “Reconstruction, 
development, and democracy are fast becoming as integral to South African 
political language as the notions of the struggle, revolution and liberation used 
to (Maluleke, 1994;245-258). This article however, found that such 
constructive criticisms do not necessarily negate the essential dominance of 
reconstruction paradigm especially in the call for constitutional reforms in 
Kenya as in many countries in Africa in post-cold war era. 
 
Setting the Constitutional Agenda 
 The 1992, multi-party general elections were held and the incumbent, 
President Moi won the elections narrowly with only 37.3 % of the total valid 
votes cast over a deeply divided opposition (Kapinde, 2015). The disunity 
among the opposition leaders was partly due to the resurgence of 
ethnocentrism which characterized the democratic transition and has remained 
unabated in Kenyan politics to date. However, the ‘invisible hand’ of president 
Moi is not overruled as he was accused of bankrolling some opposition leaders 
such as Kenneth Matiba to divide the populace Agikuyu vote to the detriment 
of a united opposition (Throup & Hornsby, 1998;412-413). Prior the re-
introduction of multi-party politics, Moi had consolidated his position through 
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a single party, Kenya African National Union (KANU), however with the 
return of party pluralism; he shifted to politics of ethnicity and perfected it 
with clientism/patronage.4 And in cases where he and his cronies felt that 
violence was a necessity, they would not hesitate to use it. To him the end 
justifies the means parlance was his political slogan (Kapinde, 2015). Drawing 
on ethnicity and democracy, Donald Horowitz contends that the spirit of 
competition which may be seen as healthy in a multi-party democracy; 
anchoring the same on ethnic nationalism may prove to be counter-productive 
(Horowitz, 1994). Since, ethnic rivalry may negate the developmental agenda 
of democracy in Africa (Ibid). Historically, multi-party democracy in Kenya 
was anchored on ethnic amalgamation, and mobilisation. Clearly, then 
political coalition(s) in the country are rather ethnic and /or intra-ethnic 
coalitions whereby the political elites appropriate their ‘ethnic good will’ for 
selfish gains (Kapinde, 2015). In such cases ethnic manifestoes are primary to 
national agenda and subsequently, the constitution is often disregarded to 
achieve myopic ethnic agenda. 
 Regarding the 1992 multi-party elections, the opposition rejected the 
results terming them rigged in favour of the incumbent. According to John 
Henry Okullu (former Bishop of Anglican Church, Maseno South Diocese) 
the rejection of the election results sent shock waves all over the world. It got 
extensive media coverage locally and internationally (Okullu, 1997;138). In 
response to opposition’s outcry, the religious community5 urged for the 
acceptance of the results despite “overwhelming evidence” indicating the 
incumbent had “desperately manipulated the election to retain power (Daily 
Nation, January 4, 1993).” A case in point is the late Archbishop of the 
Anglican Church of Kenya (1997-2002), David Gitari in his true nature of 
appreciating the values of democracy urged the opposition to accept the results 
(Mathenge, O.I, 29/01/2015). Gitari said; “it is better to accept a slightly 
rigged election than to have absolute chaos as an alternative (Ibid).” Adding 
his voice, Bishop Okullu Stated:  
My plea is, therefore, to the opposition parties to look beyond 
the rigged elections for intelligent, patriotic and peaceful 
arrangements to achieve through parliament what has been 
denied through the ballot box. Democratization is slow, 
painful, and frustrating process. Kenyans has come a long way 
in only one year. Let us cherish what we have achieved: the 
freedom to speak our mind without fear of arrest, the prospect 
                                                          
4 Government appointments as in parastatal jobs were issued out along ethnic lines to entice 
different leaders to support the government regardless of serious issues such as corruption and 
ethnic violence that marked the re-emergence of multi-partism. 
5 NCCK and the Catholic - Justice and Peace Commission, were members of a three-body 
observer team funded by donors (Daily Nation, January 4 1998) 
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of a multi-party legislature. Our resolve to resist evil should not 
bind us from these important victories (Okullu, 1997;139). 
 Apparently, both Statements from Okullu and Gitari were mediating 
and reconstructing in contrast to the 2007/2008 post poll conflict in Kenya 
where religious leaders abdicated their God-given duties to ‘tribal chiefs’ by 
remaining silent, as the country was torn apart by ethnic violence.6 However, 
it is important to note that the flawed nature of Kenya’s 1992 transition7 to 
democracy cannot solely be attributed to the unwillingness of the Moi 
administration to institute tangible structural and constitutional reforms for 
democratization. It is fair to argue that in many respects, political parties of 
the opposition also contributed to the perpetuation of oppression and 
authoritarianism in the country (Mutunga, 2000;28). Willy Mutunga (the 
former President of Supreme Court of Kenya, 2008-2016) argues that a 
number of the pro-democracy and human rights groups as well as religious 
organizations tried in vain to convince the opposition parties not to participate 
in the elections before comprehensive reforms of the Constitution in contrast 
to minimum reforms championed by politicians and the government for 
narrow political ends (Ibid). 
 On account of the aborted State transition and transformation 
following this election, and the elusive unity of the opposition in calling for 
comprehensive constitutional reforms. That made the Church, individual 
clergy, civil society and other religious groups to waiver in the debate for 
constitutional reforms. It is this failed transformation and transition that 
rekindled the lost memories of Constitutional Review that had begun in the 
nascent period of 1990s and faded immediately when Moi capitulated to multi-
party politics. But of utmost significance here is how the failed transition and 
transformation redefined the future Church-State engagement with reference 
to constitutional reforms? 
 In the aftermath of the opposition defeat, the Church refrained from 
direct engagement in the opposition affairs neither did they constructively 
engage the government on issues of public interest (Mathenge, O.I, 
29/01/2015). But still, some individual clerics from mainline Churches such 
as Timothy Njoya, Gideon Ireri and Henry Okullu, together with other leaders 
from Law Society of Kenya (LSK) and other Civil Society Organization 
                                                          
6 The dichotomy of the word de-construction is that it can have both negative and positive 
connotations. Here it has been used in a negative perspective to refer to the ethnic violence 
that characterized the nation following post election violence. On a positive note the term can 
refer to uprooting of structures of bondage. As in the case of liberation framework, 
deconstruction is actively undertaken for people to be liberated. 
7 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986:6) define a transition as “the interval 
between one political system and another”. For the case of Kenya, it was a change from one 
party governance /dictatorship to multi-party politics. 
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(CSOs) piled the pressure on the government to review the constitution (Ibid). 
Of the Church leaders, Okullu was very conspicuous on political issues and 
could be seen as an independent voice with his own political ideologies; a trait 
he shared with Timothy Njoya as they both developed a theology of power 
(Kapinde, 2015). On the other hand, Gitari appeared to be very much 
concerned with the ‘eternal political drama’ in Kirinyaga District henceforth, 
missing inaction at the national level (Muriuki & Mararo, O.I; 30/01/2015). In 
the absence of Gitari, Gideon Ireri (former bishop of Mbeere, 1998-2008) had 
virtually placed himself as one of the key actors within the Anglican Justice 
and Peace Commission (AJPC) and was leading in the campaign for 
constitution review (Ireri, O.I; 10/04/2015). However, this article found such 
efforts to be limited unless the political class were fully incorporated in the 
process. This is partly because the attitude of many politicians in Africa and 
Kenya in particular is that they would want to lead and control all process of 
political nature and that often than not they would scuttle transformational 
processes when not involved or dictate the terms even if they are 
unconstitutional. 
 Two years down the line, and KANU still in power enjoying the same 
status as back in 1980s though in a different political dispensation, Church 
leaders realized that the constitution was the ‘moral placenta’ of democracy in 
developing nations and that without constitutional reforms, the gains of multi-
partism which they had fought for during the second liberation could not be 
fully realized (Mathenge, O.I, 29/01/2015). Similar sentiments were shared by 
the politician and therefore they began to demand for minimum reforms. 
Bishop Gitari writes that this time they were not willing to go for another 
election in December 1997 without minimum constitutional reforms (Gitari, 
2014;258).  However, this change of orientation was informed by their feeling 
that the constitution as it existed tilted the political landscape in favour of the 
ruling party, KANU. And they hoped that Constitutional reforms would 
guarantee them the best shot at the presidency (Ng’ethe & Katumanga, 2003). 
 Attempting to rebuild his tarnished image, the president shocked the 
nation on 31st December, 1995 by announcing from Nakuru State House that 
he would invite foreign experts to review the constitution and hand over the 
draft to parliament for debate and ratification (Mutua, 2008;74). Perhaps, Moi 
being a ‘Professor of politics’ was ‘applying brakes’ to the process of 
constitutional making of the country which was gradually gaining momentum, 
day after day and especially with the involvement of the civil society, religious 
leaders, and opposition parties (Mathenge, O.I, 29/01/2015). James Mathenge 
in an interview with the researcher elaborated this further that Moi had realized 
that the struggle for constitutional change could have taken a similar twist as 
the battle for party-pluralism which began as a peaceful individual resistance, 
and evolved to a mass protest, henceforth, getting the backing of the 
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international community (Ibid). By all means, the regime was worried of 
domestic resistance in de-legitimization of the State to the international 
community as witnessed in aid freeze prior multi-partism (Press, 2013). 
 Such a move, however, could not deter the spirit of nationalism that 
had been entrenched in some Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) such as 
Coalition for National Convention (CNC) and Citizens Coalition for 
Constitutional Change (4C’s). In spite of the assurance, Jacob Mati observed 
that ‘Moi’s pronouncement turned out to be just hot air meant to steal thunder 
from middle class civil society groups’ coalescing around the 4Cs, and their 
published proposal for a ‘Model Constitution’ that had captured a lot of public 
imagination (Mati, 2012;127). Nonetheless, he argues that Moi’s 
announcement provided a political opportunity for greater mobilization of 
more forces in the question of Constitution Reforms (Ibid). 
 Of grand significance, and as the article shall demonstrate further is 
the involvement of the clergy from the major religious groups, drawn mainly 
from mainstream Protestant Churches affiliated to National Council of 
Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and the Roman Catholic Church (RCC). 
Furthermore, other umbrella organisations that  emerged prior the end of 1996, 
such as National Convention Assembly (NCA) and its steering committee, 
National Convention Preparatory Committee (NCPC)’8 bringing together all 
NGOs, and political parties were also animated by the religious group with an 
exception of KANU which had been sidelined from the onset (Ireri, 
O.I;10/04/2015). Despite the involvement of the religious sector in the 
constitution bandwagon, their participation was lukewarm and only picked up 
during the Ufungamano Initiative. Citing Musambayi Katumanga, the clergy 
had been made by the regime to believe that their role was to mediate between 
oppositional parties, and civil society on one hand, and the government on the 
other side (Katumanga, 1999). He observes correctly that such a move was 
aimed at preventing any unity of purpose between the religious sector and the 
opposition (Ibid). In doing so, Moi perfected on the divide and rule tactic 
employing ethnicity, and sometimes backed up by clientistic politics to the 
disadvantage of reform groups. 
 In view of the foregoing discussion, NCA transformed its steering 
council, NCPC into an executive arm, henceforth, the National Convention 
Executive Council (NCEC) which presided over a series of violent protest 
rallies and other forms of mass action and civil disobedience within major 
towns in Kenya popularly known as Saba Saba.9 Mati writes that from then on 
                                                          
8 For more on NCA and NCEC read Willy Mutunga’ book entitled: Constitution Making from 
the Middle (1999). He explored on the process of constitution making in Kenya and examined 
the opportunities,  successes  and  challenges  that characterized the process  and  also  the 
general civil society role in participatory democracy. 
9 Saba saba or ‘Seven Seven’ protest were held on 7th July of every month throughout 1990s. 
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the clarion call from NCEC was ‘No Reforms No Elections (Mati, 2012;135).’ 
According to Winnie Mitulla this was aimed at pressurizing the government 
into conceding and instituting the process of constitutional reforms before the 
December 1997 elections (Mitulla, 2003;212-235). However, of equal 
importance to the study is the violent nature of the protests as it seemed to be 
‘a bait set for the regime’ to react with force in order for the movement to gain 
legitimacy and sympathy from the public and henceforth de-legitimaze the 
State which had claimed to have won the previous election fairly (Katumanga, 
1999). Underlying such defiance, Katumanga argues that the public would 
understand not only the type and nature of regime that ran the State, but   the 
issues under contestation would also find resonance in the public domain 
(Ibid).  
 
The Bloody Protest and the Church on Retreat 
 As the General election in 1997 approached, president Moi accepted 
minimum reforms in the constitution as demanded by the opposition under the 
Inter-Parliamentary Parties Group (IPPG) chaired by Raila Odinga then leader 
of National Democratic Party (NDP). The acceptance of minimum reforms 
prior election by the politicians was seen as a by partisan approach, however 
to the religious leaders this was a ‘cosmetic surgery’ to the constitution 
(Kapinde, 2015). Since the contentious underlying issues could only be 
addressed through comprehensive reforms. It should also be understood that 
this was not the first betrayal of the Church and civil society groups by the 
politicians but rather a demonstration that the opposition just like the 
government were only interested in acquisition of power and had no national 
agenda at heart. Therefore, the Church backtracked on commenting on 
political issues with a few individual Church clerics such as Timothy Njoya 
and Henry Okullu participating in constitutional debates but under the banner 
of civil society. Meanwhile, civil society groups mainly NEC with a few 
religious leaders such as Njoya intensified street demonstrations which often 
turned chaotic (see figure 1). 
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Fig.1: Police attack demonstrators outside parliament buildings on Saba-Saba, 1997 
(Adapted from Jacob Mati, 2012;138) 
 
 When commenting on street protests, Gideon Ireri in an interview with 
the researcher observed that Seventh, July, 1997, which came to be called 
Saba-Saba was a dark day for National Convention Executive Council 
(NCEC) and some religious leaders (Ireri, O.I; 14/04/2015). As usual, NCEC 
had organized demonstration in the city to compel the government to consider 
their views on constitutional review. However, the police descended on 
demonstrators who had taken refuge at All Saints Cathedral Anglican Church 
of Kenya (at the CBD of Nairobi), tear gassed and beaten many people, 
including several opposition politicians, the clergy and leaders of NCEC 
(Gitari et al, 2002;83). On this incidence, Mati argues that the greatest casualty 
were two key members of NCEC, namely, Kepta Ombati and Rev. Timothy 
Njoya who were seriously clobbered and maimed (Mati, 2012;136). He further 
observes that blood was spewed everywhere in the Church whilst used teargas 
canisters also lay everywhere inside the building (Ibid). Outside, fourteen 
people had been shot dead including five university students (Katumanga, 
1999). However, this number is disputed as Timothy Njoya claimed that 
twenty-one people lost their lives in this mayhem (Njoya, O. I; 29/07/2002). 
Numbers notwithstanding, police brutality against the harmless demonstrators 
exposed how desperate the regime was in curtailing the reform process. 
 According to Katumanga the net effect of the regime repression and 
brutality as witnessed during the Saba-Saba had been the key objective of 
NCEC from the onset; that is (was), to legitimize the reform process while 
conversely de-legitimizing the State as a result of its anti-reform activities, 
especially predatory violence against civilians (Katumanga, 1999). It is in the 
foregoing context that the Church and religious leaders emerged in the 
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constitution agenda under the banner of the Peoples Commission of Kenya 
(PCK) which was popularly known as the Ufungamano Initiative. 
 This article established that on the strategy of tarnishing the regimes 
image, NCEC succeeded, as the heightened State intolerance was condemned 
worldwide by spiritual and political leaders alike (Ireri, O.I; 
14/04/2015).Global Anglican leaders including Rowan Williams, Michael 
Geoffrey Peers, Bundo Kim and Anglican UN ambassador, James Hamilton 
Ottley protested State brutality against citizens. In an open protest letter to 
President Moi, Rowan Williams, the former Archbishop of Canterbury 
(Anglican Church, England) wrote: 
It is with great dismay and sorrow that we read of a police 
attack on the worshippers at the Cathedral in Nairobi on July 
7th. Christian buildings have always been regarded as 
sanctuaries in which violence was outlawed, and it seems only 
right that there should be public assurance that a Church should 
not be violated again (Gitari et al., 2002;100). 
 On his part, Michael Geoffrey Peers, the Anglican Primate of Canada 
(1986 - 2004) went as far as demanding an apology from the government. Part 
of his letter says; “I am distressed by action that harasses worshippers who 
gather to pray for the well-being of your country. I join my voice with others 
around the world to protest acts of violence carried out against people who are 
gathered peacefully. I hope you will disassociate yourself from such action by 
making an apology on behalf of the government to the leaders of All Saints 
Cathedral (Gitari et al., 2002;100-102).” Arguing along these lines, Bishop 
Bundo Kim, Primate of the Anglican Church of Korea charged; “it is 
regrettable that Kenyan police force invaded the Temple of God, destroyed the 
Church facilities, shot barrages of tear gas bullets, inflicted violence and 
arrested innocent citizens who sought refuge in the Church. We believe that a 
power that fails to respect the Church cannot last long. We urge your 
government to render an apology (Gitari et al., 2002;102).’’ Others such as 
Rev. James Hamilton Ottley, the then Anglican observer at the United Nations 
(UN) called for thorough investigation over police brutality. He also requested 
president Moi to use his offices to take specific measures which can prevent 
such occurrence in the future (Ibid, 105). 
 Drawing upon this sacrilegious act, Moi had proved that the Church 
was no longer sanctuaries. Whilst giving his testimony during the cleansing 
ceremony, Hon. Kamau Icharia (Member of Parliament for Kiambaa 
Constituency) claimed that during the Mau Mau War of Independence (1952-
1960) some freedom fighters took refuge in a Church and the British soldiers 
pursuing them did not enter due to the attachment bestowed on the temple of 
God (Mutunga, 2013). This was contrary to 1980s whereby despite State 
censorship and limited freedom of speech, the Church was a privileged 
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institution as the clerics engaged in peaceful resistance through the pulpit 
without any fear of arrest and detention (Muoki & Kapinde, 2016). However, 
this time round Moi was sending a signal to the Church that ‘politics is a dirty 
game’ and I had warned you. 
 A week later, on 13th July, 1997, Archbishop David Gitari (the bishop 
and cleric in-charge of All Saints Cathedral) responded to Moi’s ‘zealots’ and 
their sacrilegious act in a desecration ceremony in the Church attended by 
thousands of people (Gitari, 2014;259-262). He purposefully preached from 
the book of Daniel chapter 5; a sermon entitled: ‘Mene Mene Tekel, Parsin’ 
(Gitari et al., 2002;83). Gitari and other prelates of ACK began by cleansing 
the cathedral using blessed water- all round, in a colourful inclusive procession 
of clergy, lay leaders and members of the congregation as shown in figure 2 
below (Gitari, 2014; 259-262). 
 
Fig.2: Archbishop David Gitari Cleansing the All Saint Cathedral, Nairobi (Picture courtesy 
of  John Mwendwa) 
 
 After desecration, Gitari embarked on exposition of the book of Daniel 
Chapter 5. In his exposition, Gitari had paralleled the socio-political context 
of Kenya to Babylon and how the reign of King Nebuchadnezzar and his son 
Belshazzar ended prematurely (Ireri, O.I; 14/04/2015). Willy Mutunga in his 
eulogy to the late Gitari acknowledged that this was the greatest political 
sermon that had ever been preached in Kenya (Mutunga, 2013). He stressed 
that; “for the majority of people who attended the service, the words; “Mene 
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Mene Tekel Uparsin” will never be forgotten. Moreover, their interpretation 
was given again and again, and by the time Gitari finished his sermon, they 
had been committed to the memory of  all,  even  for  those  in attendance who 
may have had poor memories (Mutunga, 2013). This powerful solemn and 
provocative sermon was preceded by the song, “Onward Christian Soldiers,” 
and that had the prelate hesitated, Christians/congregants could have marched 
to State House to oust president Moi (Ibid). 
 The above exposition of the book of Daniel was a clear warning to Moi 
that his days in office were numbered and his fall inevitable. Gitari avers that, 
‘I told the president that the hand of God had not yet written; “Mene Mene, 
Tekel Uparsin (Gitari, 2014;260) but if those in authority (Moi) refuse 
dialogue and fail to hear the cries of the people and continue to harden their 
hearts then the hand of God would write on the wall of State House (Gitari et 
al., 2002;93).” 
 In the midst of these domestic and international condemnations and 
fear that the donor community could call for economic sanctions, president 
Moi capitulated to Gitari’s sermon on 15th July, 1997 by inviting some 
religious leaders to State House for a dialogue (Mati, 2012;141). The call for 
dialogue was in line with the reconstruction model articulated by Mugambi as 
both the ‘oppressor and the oppressed’ are involved in deconstruction of 
oppressive structures. In spite of such a move, Gitari and other religious 
leaders were very skeptical of this invitation because all along they believed 
Moi was a ‘political conman’ and was always backtracking on his words as in 
the case of his Nakuru declaration when he promised to invite international 
experts to review the constitution (Mathenge, O.I, 29/01/2015). True to his 
words, Mati observes that Moi allegedly sought the clergy’s help in containing 
the NCEC tide with a promise that he was  now  for reforms (Mati, 2012;141). 
However, according to Mutunga, Gitari was persuaded to accompany his 
brethren to State House against his better judgment since he was fully aware 
of the ‘cunning nature’ of the president (Mutunga, 2013). 
 Despite such reservations, their attendance was not in vain as the 
president conceded to some of the clerics demand (Ireri, O.I; 14/04/2015). 
Gitari said: “the president told us that he had accepted the constitution to be 
amended before the December polls. He also requested the clerics to mediate 
between the opposition MPs and government ministers on how to review the 
constitution (Gitari, 2014; 262).” However, it is important to observe that these 
concessions made by the State cannot be solely attributed to the clergy’s 
activism rather the international condemnation and the street protests as well. 
Gideon Ireri acknowledged that the cleansing of the Church by Gitari and 
worldwide condemnation of State brutality forced Moi to soften his stance 
(Ibid). James Mathenge corroborated this further when he observed that Moi 
being a ‘Church goer’ might have been fully informed on the context and 
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content of the sermon and its implication to his reign (Mathenge, O.I, 
29/01/2015).  The article contends here that the Church as a social institution 
had a voice and force to compel and direct the regime’s behavior towards a 
particular direction though with some limitations. 
 What is intriguing in the quest for constitutional reforms in Kenya is 
how Moi managed to manipulate different pressure groups through different 
strategies including ethnicity, violence, arrest and detention of members of 
NCEC and co-optation (Ireri, O.I; 14/04/2015). The latest casualty of Moi’s 
political machination was the clergy as they were perceived by the regime as 
mediators between NCEC and KANU. Demonstrating his sincerity and desire 
to reconstruct the image of his government to the international community and 
donor nations, Moi went as far as agreeing to the enactment of a law in 
parliament, the Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 1997 (Mati, 2012;141). 
Moreover, he acquiesced to minimum reforms negotiated by Inter 
Parliamentary Parties Group (IPPG) with a promise that comprehensive 
reforms would follow after the 1997 - General election (Ibid). 
 After the elections, Moi backtracked and was no longer interested in 
comprehensive reforms hence confirming Gitari’s worst fears over negotiation 
with the regime and especially moving closer to Moi as it exposed the clergy 
to co-optation, henceforth weakening their prophetic voices (Ireri, O.I; 
14/04/2015). The opposition members of parliament were also not immune to 
such co-optation as National Development Party (NDP) led by Raila Odinga 
and Ford Kenya of Kijana Wamalwa also crossed the floor to join the 
government (Ibid). Such undertakings punctured the ‘wheels of constitution 
making.’ Consequently, the struggle became slow but also posed a challenge 
to NCEC which was becoming popular with the citizens on the grass root as 
well as urban dwellers. On this betrayal by the political class, Mutua argues 
that a majority of the opposition politicians were already feeling irrelevant as 
NCEC was firmly in control of the struggles, the mobilization structures, and 
networks (Mutua, 2008). However, foreign diplomats and the donor 
community also played a role in persuading the opposition MPs to join the 
IPPGs meetings which were being chaired by Raila to the disadvantage of 
NCEC. This only confirmed Stephen Brown’s contestation that the donor 
nations subverted meaningful transformations in the country.10A trend that has 
continued in Post-Nyayo era, where foreign donors will rather endorse un-
democratic processes as long it serves western agenda. 
 Meanwhile, KANU and the IPPG failed to institute any meaningful 
reforms as the president usurped powers through the office of the then 
                                                          
10 For a detailed study on how the foreign powers and the donor community helped  to keep 
Moi in power see Stephen Brown, (2001) Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in 
Africa: How foreign Donors  help to keep Kenya's Daniel Arap Moi in power. Third World 
Quarterly. Vol. 22 (5): pp.725-739. 
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Attorney- General Amos Wako, leaving some radical opposition members 
with no option but to walk out of the talks (Chitris, O.I 08/07/2015). On the 
other hand, NCEC re-organized itself and continued with what Jacob Mati 
referred as ‘pressure politics’ namely mass protests which did not augur well 
with the religious leaders such as Gitari due its chaotic nature (Mati, 
2012;143). In the view of the aforementioned, it is noteworthy that the Church 
has and can continue to play a critical role in opening up space for debate, and 
democratization, however, it is not immune to State co-optation. In the 
struggle for constitutional reforms the Church’s’ position was not properly 
grounded due to multiplicity of players, some of which like the politicians 
have different objects altogether.  
 
The Ufungamano Initiative (1999-2002) 
 With intensified NEC protests all over the country owing to the co-
optation of major political players including a section of Right Wing 
Evangelical Protestant Churches by the regime, the mainline Churches 
including Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Catholic coalesced under the 
banner of Ufungamano Initiative to spearhead comprehensive constitutional 
reforms. 
 On the emergence of Ufungamano Initiative, Jacob Mati poignantly 
points out that: 
The Ufungamano Initiative was an offshoot of NCEC. Part of 
its emergence was because NCEC was perceived to be very 
radical. There was therefore a need in the view of the 
international donor community and the political elite as a 
whole, and not just the opposition, together with the religious 
groups, to kind of de-radicalize the contention (Mati, 
2012;120). 
 This new development was characterized by the endemic acrimony 
that had developed between the government, opposition parties and Civil 
society groups; religious community included on the one hand. Henceforth 
limiting opportunities for comprehensive constitution reforms (Chitris, O.I 
08/07/2015). Interestingly, all parties were invited to convene at Ufungamano 
House (an ecumenical building owned by NCCK and Catholic Church) for 
way forward including KANU which had been a stumbling block towards 
constitutional review.  On 15th December, 1999, Gitari with other religious 
leaders drawn mainly from Catholic, Methodist, NCCK, and Hindu Council 
alongside the Civil Society Groups (CSGs) attended the first Stakeholders 
forum at Ufungamano House (Ireri, O.I; 14/04/2015). This meeting took two 
days and it was chaired by former Archbishop David Gitari of the Anglican 
Church of Kenya (ACK) that gave birth to a Steering Council (SC) of 36 
Religious leaders who were committed to “a people driven Constitutional 
European Scientific Journal February 2018 edition Vol.14, No.5 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
230 
Reform Process in Kenya (Gitari et al., 2002;93).”Gideon Ireri, former bishop 
of Anglican Diocese of Mbeere (1997-2008) outlined the objective of the 
Steering Council as follows:-i) to provide leadership, guidance and to give 
direction and policy of the aspirations of Religious community, and  ii) to 
foster dialogue and understanding amongst themselves and amongst different 
sections of Kenya society in Constitution Review process (Ireri, O.I; 
14/04/2015). At the end of this convention, they promised to use mosques, 
temples and Churches as forums for civic education, consultation and collating 
views for the constitutional review process (Murunga & Nasong’o, 2007;46). 
 Apart from the Steering Council which was the final decision making 
organ, the meeting resolved to form the People’s Commission of Kenya (PCK) 
which came to existence in June 2000 to deal with collecting of views and 
preparation of the draft. This body was chaired by the late Dr. Ooki Ombaka 
(Ireri, O.I; 14/04/2015). But Gitari continued chairing the council meetings, 
however, later it was unanimously agreed that the meeting should be co-
chaired on rotational basis among the heads of the various religious 
communities (Ibid). Rashmin Chitris claimed that this decision was arrived at 
to avoid any leadership wrangles that have wrecked other social movements 
(Chitris, O.I 08/07/2015). 
 In countering the Ufungamano movement, the government launched a 
parallel parliamentary constitutional review process through Inter-Parties 
Parliamentary Group (IPPG) under the chairmanship of Raila Odinga, the 
party leader of NDP (Chitris, O.I 08/07/2015). However, according to Mati 
these new developments were significant as they opened fertile grounds for 
further contestation between the Ufungamano Initiative comprising members 
of the mainline Churches, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and some 
opposition parties, and on the other side, the parliamentary select committee 
being supported by Raila- led NDP and some of the regime’s traditional 
partners:-  Evangelical  Fellowship  of  Kenya (EFK)  and its  member  
Churches including Africa Inland Church (AIC),  the  African  Independent  
Pentecostal  Church  of  Africa (AIPCA),  the  Deliverance  Church, Redeemed  
Gospel  Church  of  Kenya,  and  the  Church  of  God  in  East  Africa (Mati, 
2012;148). However, the division of the Church between the two factions 
pulling towards different directions, only help to cement the narrative that the 
Church in Kenya as elsewhere in Africa have never responded with ‘one 
prophetic voice’ in the public culture. Perturbed by this normative behavior, 
Damaris Parsitau blamed the emergence of Neo-Pentecostal Churches as 
having contributed to the Church’s mixed signals in public sphere (Parsitau, 
2011;123-145). 
 Despite such challenges, David Gitari was appointed as one of the 
spokesperson of the Steering Council (SC) on 15th March, 2000 to keep the 
public through the media, fully informed on the progress of the Ufungamano 
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Initiative (Gitari et al., 2002;26).” It appears that Ufungamano Initiative was 
the brainchild of Gitari among other religious leaders; however, this is 
contested by both Gideon Ireri and Rashmin Chitris. Bishop Ireri in an 
interview with the researcher claimed that Gitari did not attend most meetings 
of the Ufungamano Initiative hence such an individual could not be entrusted 
to articulate the issues of the Initiative (Ireri, O.I; 14/04/2015).11 Whilst 
Rashmin Chitris argues that Ufungamano was a dream of Kenyans and 
religious leaders were bound by common interest and therefore, they were 
issuing joint press Statements (Chitris, O.I 08/07/2015).12 
 A critical analysis of the minutes of Ufungamano Initiative clearly 
corroborated this assertion by Gideon Ireri that most meetings between 2001 
and 2002 were not regularly attended by Gitari.13 What is intriguing is the fact 
that someone who is credited for being one of the founder member(s) of an 
organization could lose interest in the activities of the same organization 
which he helped to build. This raises a number of questions on the 
Ufungamano Initiative. For instance, was there a simmering contestation 
between moderates and radicals or among the representatives? What could 
have made Gitari to lose enthusiasm with Ufungamano or had he been 
compromised by the regime? 
 In an attempt to unpack some of the underlying issues, Bishop Ireri 
admitted that Gitari was not comfortable with Rev. Mutava Musyimi (current 
Member of Parliament for Mbeere Constituency) by then the secretary of the 
movement.14 This was compounded by the fact that Hon. Mutava Musyimi, 
                                                          
11 Gideon Ireri was one of the representatives of ACK in the Ufungamano Initiative and played 
a leading role especially in the post-Gitari era (2002-2008). He doubled up as the Bishop of 
Mbeere diocese (1998- 2008) and at one point he served as a co-chair with Rashmin Chitris. 
12 Rashmin Chitris in a personal communication with the researcher elucidated this further 
that Mutava Musyimi seemed to have been the undisputed spoke-person of Ufungamano 
Initiative, however, the Steering Council which was composed mainly of religious leaders 
hold joint press conferences. He argues that the joint press conference does not downplay the 
key role that Gitari played in articulating the agenda of the Initiative. 
13 I schemed through the following minutes of Steering Committee meetings held at 
Ufungamano House on various dates such as; Ufungamano Initiative Stakeholder Council 
Meeting (19/01/2000); Ufungamano Initiative Steering Council meeting (08/08/2000) and 
Ufungamano Initiative Report of March 21 2001, the Plenary of Stakeholders meeting, 
(21/03/2001). In all these meeting(s), David Gitari was absent with apology whilst in others 
his name was completely missing. However, in an interview with Rashmin Chitris, he argues 
that since the steering Council was dominated by heads of various religious community it was 
likely that they were engaged in other religious duties and their absenteeism should not be 
construed as lack of interest. Interestingly, he admitted that some members of the Ufungamano 
were not happy with Mutava Musyimi as it seemed that he was interested in achieving the 
objectives of NCCK at the expense of broader aims of the Initiative. 
14 Gideon Ireri claimed that Gitari ordained Mutava Musyimi in 1989 by then Gitari was the 
incumbent bishop of Mt. Kenya East diocese. However, during the Ufungamano Initiative, he 
was serving as the archbishop of ACK and Mutava Musyimi would dismiss him outright 
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one of the co-conveners of the Ufungamano Initiative could dismiss Gitari 
during the meetings without considering his views as he regarded him to be 
too radical. He further observed that Gitari was a forerunner in many activities 
and could not allow others to lead him (Ireri, O.I; 14/04/2015). Owing to the 
fact that Bishop Gitari had ordained Mutava Musyimi as a priest and helped 
him to rise through the ranks within NCCK and eventually becoming the 
Secretary General of the organization, according to Gideon Ireri, the prelate 
expected Mutava to show some respect [sic] to him as the Archbishop (Ibid). 
However, this was not the case, Mati argues that Mutava Musyimi usurp the 
powers within the movement by the virtue of his position in NCCK and 
overshadowed the Steering Council (SC) which was one of the top decision 
making organ (Mati, 2012;252). In the end, Mutava became the undisputed 
spokesperson of Ufungamano. 
 The first hypothesis is sharply contested by John Mararo who claimed 
that Gitari as the Archbishop of ACK (1997-2002) was involved in so many 
ecumenical movements and activities (Mararo, O.I; 30/01/2015). Therefore, 
the possibility of being absent from some meetings was inevitable; however, 
that does not in any way show that he lacked interest (Ibid). Interestingly, 
Mararo admitted that when it comes to leadership, Gitari was always in 
forefront and could not allow others to lead him (Mararo, O.I; 30/01/2015). 
Both arguments are tenable. In fact, Ufungamano as a corporate body of 
religious communities and leaders was not immune to internal division and 
conflicts that are inherent in CSOs. Mati astutely observes that “the 
Ufungamano Initiative was riddled with many contradictions and cleavages, 
which served both as opportunities but also constraints in its work (Mati, 
2013). Particularly, the existing mistrust between radical civil society and 
opposition  political  elites offered  an opportunity  for  moderation and 
arbitration by the religious  leadership (Ibid).  The catalytic role of the 
religious community forged unity that was necessary for any meaningful 
progress. 
 In the absence of universal unity within the Christian community as 
seen in Gitari and Mutavas’ case, mistrusts developed and the radical secular 
civil society composed mainly of young lawyers, Nairobi University students, 
and other urban middle class dwellers felt dissatisfied with religious leadership 
in the Initiative (Chitris, O.I; 08/07/2015. Some felt that some of the clergy 
were working in cohort with the State and derailing the process. Mutua 
supports this view regarding religious leaders being sympathizers of the State 
(Mutua, 2008). In one incident, Gitari was approached by two senior political 
leaders who happened to be members of ACK. Although the motive of their 
                                                          
during the meetings. He augured that this did not go well with Gitari. Henceforth, he started 
missing meetings. 
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visit is unknown, but according to Karanja they were sent by the regime to 
persuade him to denounce the activities of Ufungamano (Karanja, 2008;89-
92). He argued that the government targeted Gitari because he was a powerful 
and influential member of the religious group (Ibid). 
 On the one hand, it is proper to argue that the radical approach of 
secular civil society, academic activists and student organizations was 
unhealthy for the incubation of democratic reforms in the country hence the 
moderation role of the religious leaders was a necessity for reforms to 
materialize (Ufungamano Initiative, 1999;38/99). This, I have argued was 
done through Episcopal conferences, Newsletters, political sermons, mass 
media, pastoral letters and sometimes through closed-door negotiations to 
avoid any fall-out. As Ufungamano Initiative was moving around the country 
collecting and colligating peoples view for constitutional proposal, the Raila-
led Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitutional Reform was not leaving 
anything to chance as they put in place an Enabling Act through Parliament in 
October 2000 (Wandera, 2011). Subsequently, the Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission (CKRC) was established under the chairmanship of Yash 
Paul Ghai (CKRC, 2002b;2). This led to a new wave of contention between 
Ufungamano stakeholders and the State led process, as Ghai demanded for the 
merger of the two processes. Despite such struggles between the Ufungamano 
Initiative and the Ghai-led CKRC, the CKRC enjoyed statutory legitimacy and 
ended up negotiating successfully for a merger with the Ufungamano Initiative 
(Mitulla, 2003). 
 From the empirical analysis, it is clear that Gitari might not have been 
the captain of Ufungamano Initiatives due to cases of absenteeism as revealed 
by the minutes of the Steering Council (SC) but he still remains as one of the 
engineers that dug the tunnels by which the entire process of a peoples driven 
constitution got its bearing. Arguably, whilst the constitutional change 
processes hit a snag prior the Ufungamano Initiative due to unnecessary 
partisan politics and interest as validated by the empirical data, it is evident 
that the Ufungamano achieved some of its goals. Since, it managed to initiate 
a parallel people driven process towards constitution review. This however, 
according to John Chesworth, impelled the Moi regime to initiate the long-
expected process of establishing an official commission namely CKRC 
(Chesworth, 2009;164).  
 In summary, Ufungamano Initiative managed to bring over 50 Civil 
Society Organisations (CSO) together as it struck a middle ground between 
radical and moderate members of the movement in accord to the 
reconstruction model advanced in this study. Despite class, ideological, and 
ethnic polarization that have characterized other social movements, Mati 
argues that the success of the Ufungamano Initiative in bringing different 
forces  together as in the question of constitutional review suggests  that  
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‘broad  based social movements  are  possible  when  the  resultant  movement  
or  alliance  can  offer  a  middle  ground coalition that has the ability to mop-
up the various competing interests (Mati, 2013; 235-254)’. Based on this 
assertion, the clergy, and other religious leaders such as Gitari played a central 
role in breaking a middle ground between the divergent forces into a common 
ground for constitutional reforms.  
 
o Critical Appraisal of Reconstruction Model in light of 
Constitutional Development 
 This article took the view that liberation and reconstruction models are 
twin un-identical frameworks of analysing African challenges in post-cold war 
period and beyond. The double paradigm was sufficient historio-analytic 
model for examining the complex interactions between the Ufungamano 
Initiative and the State as undertaken by the Church and other religious leaders 
in constitution making process. To buttress the significance of liberation 
praxis in the agitation for constitutional reforms, Mati observes: 
Many of the so-called radical clergy in Kenya borrowed 
a leaf from the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. who once said: ‘any 
religion that is not concerned about the poor and 
disadvantaged, the slums that damn them, the economic 
conditions that strangle them, and the social conditions that 
cripple them, is a spiritually moribund religion awaiting burial 
(Mati, 2012;167).’ 
 This exhortation only serves to establish that liberation and 
reconstruction models are ‘cyclical theologies’ in Africa, and in response to 
either repression or intransigence on the part of an authoritarian State. 
Conversely, this contradicts Mugambi’s declaration of a paradigm shift to 
some extent since socio-political context, and the State behaviour on one hand 
determines the appropriateness of the paradigm for engagement. Making some 
to be minor whilst others dominant. Similar, sentiments are advanced by Julius 
Gathogo on ‘Major Versus Minor’ paradigms in his ‘post-mortem’ analysis of 
Jesse Mugambi’s reconstruction theory (Gathogo, 2008). The dilemma we 
might face henceforth; who and how is the appropriate model of Church-State 
engagement determined? Who steers the process especially in a socio-
culturally dynamic society such as Kenya? The common denominator of these 
empirical questions is that they point to some limitations of the proposal which 
is beyond the scope of this article. 
 In terms of constitutional development discussed under the 
Ufungamano Initiative, Jesse Mugambi glorified reconstruction model when 
he said:  
This theology should be reconstructive rather than destructive, 
inclusive rather than exclusive, complementary rather than 
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competitive; integrative rather than disintegrative; programme 
driven rather than project–driven; people centred rather than 
institution–centred; deed-oriented rather than word–oriented; 
participatory rather than autocratic; regenerative rather than 
confrontational; consultative rather than impositional 
(Mugambi,1995; XV). 
 In view of the above exposition, Valentin Dedji argues that theology 
of reconstruction is “an inter-faith and inter-denominational enterprise (Dedji, 
2003;5).” The article found both statements to be in accord to the 
constitutional reforms as undertaken by the religious community in 
consolidation of Kenya’s democracy. The Ufungamano Initiative was 
inclusive as it cut across many religious faith and denominations. Mati 
exemplifies this further when he avers that the Initiative had a total of 54 
organisations running from grassroot community organisations to middle class 
civil society groups (Mati, 2013). The religious community included: United 
Methodist Churches of Kenya (UMCK), Anglican Church of Kenya (ACK), 
Organization of African Instituted Churches (OAIC), Hindu Council of Kenya 
(HCK), Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA) and Supreme Council of 
Kenya Muslims- SUPKEM (Ufungamano Initiative, 2001/21). They took the 
struggle for constitutional reforms within as part of the reconstruction agenda 
set by African theo-philosopher, Jesse Mugambi. 
 Viewed broadly, the article is also alive to the fact that constitutional 
reforms cannot be sufficiently conceptualized under reconstruction15 praxis 
per se. Owing to heterogeneity of players in the reforms train as reflected on 
the constituencies that were represented during the Ufungamano Initiative and 
the street protests. Most likely the call for reforms was in tandem with Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith and John Hike theory of religious pluralism as well. Which 
set on the premise that Christianity as a religion is not necessarily the be-all 
and end– all of all religion and religious trajectories (Smith, 1979). This 
ecumenical approach puts much emphasis on religious dialogue.  Similar 
                                                          
15 The study takes this precaution in line to Elelwani Bethuel Farisanis’ (2003:41) 
critique; that in adopting Reconstruction as the new theological paradigm, one needs to be 
careful with the Ezra-Nehemiah text as it is “biased against the am haaretz.” He champions 
for a critical re-reading of Ezra-Nehemiah text (Farisani 2003: 48). According to Farisani as 
cited by Gathogo Julius, uncritical reading refers to any reading of the Bible which is short of 
thorough exegetical inquiry; for it can be used to marginalize and thereby exclude the am 
haaretz of our times in national building. How true is this for our case? In constitutional 
making process public participation is important as seen in the Ufungamano Initiative which 
was a conglomeration of many civil society groups inclusive of religious leaders, politicians 
and grass root supporters. Consequently, introducing Wilfred Cantwell and John Hike theory 
of Religious pluralism makes Ufungamano a all-inclusive social movement and eliminates 
Farisanis’ argument on reconstruction model in the struggle for constitution making and 
nation building. (See Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1979). 
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arguments are also advanced by Tsawe Munga wa Chidongo as he blamed the 
‘superiority syndrome’ on Christianity and Islam and especially by their 
failure to enter into constructive dialogue with African Indigenous Religion 
(AIR) in the contemporary development of Kenya (Chidongo, 2014;102-114). 
The Ufungamano Initiative although marked with numerous challenges was a 
success of the reconstruction paradigm in Kenya. 
 
Conclusion 
 The article argued that despite the opening of space to multi party 
democracy from single party dictatorship, the transformation and transition of 
the State to that end was severely hindered right from the beginning. It 
observed that the quest for meaningful constitutional reforms was scuttled by 
both the opposition and the State as the reform agenda became a class struggle 
rather than people driven initiative. Ethnicity, political patronage and narrow 
interest all played out to derail the reformation process. This article established 
that religious leader’s initiative to mediate over constitution making process 
was characterised by infiltration by the State apparatus with an attempt to co-
opt some of them. In this scheme, politicians were not left out as majority of 
them capitulated to State antics to derail the much needed reforms. Despite 
such bottlenecks, notable religious leaders from the Church such as David 
Gitari, Henry Okullu, Gideon Ireri, and Timothy Njoya played a critical role 
in the pursuit for democratic space through constitutional reforms. In 
particular, Gitari’s active role during the cleansing ceremony at the Nairobi 
ACK Cathedral and the political sermon vis a` vis ‘Mene Mene Tekel 
Uparsin,’ threatened the regime as it exposed its brutality and at the same time 
legitimized the call for constitutional reforms. The epitome of these 
developments was seen in the Ufungamano Initiative which was a religious 
umbrella organization including other religious leaders such as those from 
Islam, and Hindu religions. As a dynamic religious movement with wide 
constituencies, Ufungamano Initiative was prone to diverse interests and 
leadership wrangles and therefore the primary goal might have been chopped 
off by secondary objectives marked by partisan interests. On the other hand, 
its’ heterogeneity in composition proved to be a double hedged sword to 
success as it opened a ‘battlefield of interests’ geared towards recognition and 
attention which eventually clouded its’ constitutional reform agenda. In 
summation, the article argued that the Church leaders resolve for reforms in 
the country proved the critics of Jesse Mugambi wrong since their unity under 
Ufungamano and merger under the Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission (CKRC) left no room for anything less than constitutional 
reforms. 
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